Picking up on What\u27s Going Underground: Australia Should Exempt Carbon Capture and Geo-Sequestration from Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act by Andrews, Adam M.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 17 Number 2 
3-1-2008 
Picking up on What's Going Underground: Australia Should 
Exempt Carbon Capture and Geo-Sequestration from Part IIIA of 
the Trade Practices Act 
Adam M. Andrews 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Adam M. Andrews, Comment, Picking up on What's Going Underground: Australia Should Exempt Carbon 
Capture and Geo-Sequestration from Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act, 17 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 407 
(2008). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol17/iss2/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright © 2008 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association 
 
PICKING UP ON WHAT’S GOING UNDERGROUND: 
AUSTRALIA SHOULD EXEMPT CARBON CAPTURE AND 
GEO-SEQUESTRATION FROM PART IIIA OF THE 
TRADE PRACTICES ACT 
Adam M. Andrews† 
Abstract:  Australia has identified carbon capture and geo-sequestration (“CCS”) as 
a partial solution to the problem of global warming.  CCS involves capturing carbon 
dioxide from large point-source emitters, such as power plants, and injecting it deep 
below ground level for disposal.  Australia has not yet enacted CCS-specific regulations. 
As it stands now, Australia’s third-party access law, Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act, 
creates regulatory uncertainty for CCS infrastructure projects and will deter investment in 
the industry.  This regulatory uncertainty results from the ambiguous criteria used to 
determine whether a piece of infrastructure is appropriate for third-party access. 
Legislators could address the ambiguity of Part IIIA by creating an industry specific 
third-party access regime for CCS.  However, doing so would be difficult without 
foreknowledge of how the industry will develop, would generate significant compliance 
costs, and would also likely deter investment.  In the near term, CCS should be exempted 
from Part IIIA altogether to encourage private companies to invest in CCS.  Exemption 
would provide investors with the expectation that they can recoup the costs of their 
investments without submitting to mandatory access requirements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Australia has identified a process called “carbon capture and geo-
sequestration” (“CCS”) as a viable way to both address the problem of 
global warming and continue to use fossil fuels for energy. 1  CCS is the 
process of first trapping flue gases from large point-source emitters, then 
capturing the carbon dioxide from those gases, compressing that carbon 
dioxide, transporting it, and finally, injecting it deep underground for 
disposal.2  CCS depends upon established science but has not yet been 
                                           
†
 Juris Doctor expected 2009, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to 
thank Professor Brendan Sweeney for his explication of Australian competition law.  He was invaluable in 
refining this piece and in fleshing out the treatment of the Trade Practices Act.  Specifically, he pointed out 
that the abuse of market power provisions contained in Section 46 complement the third-party access 
regime of Part IIIA. The author would also like to thank Professor Dongsheng Zang, Professor Dwight 
Drake, Professor Veronica Taylor, Stephanie Kotecki, Tom and Lauren Andrews, and the Braintrust at 338 
NE 51st for their ongoing support and boundless wisdom. 
1
  Australian Greenhouse Office, Dep’t of the Environment and Heritage, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Fact Sheet (2006), http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/ccs/ 
publications/pubs/fs-ccs.pdf. 
2
  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and 
Storage, 19 (B. Mertz et. al., eds., 2005) [hereinafter IPCC Report]. 
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implemented on a significant scale.3  The cost of capturing carbon dioxide 
remains a serious obstacle to widespread adoption of CCS, but in the minds 
of many scientists and politicians this obstacle is surmountable when 
considered against the backdrop of the alternatives.4  Because world energy 
forecasts predict continued global reliance on fossil fuels for decades to 
come,5 CCS stands as an important mitigation strategy over the medium 
term.6 
Many CCS projects around the world are in development.7  The 
largest of these projects will be the Gorgon development just off the 
northwest coast of Australia, expected to be operational in 2010.8  The 
natural gas fields there contain between 12% and 14% carbon dioxide.9  
Normally, a natural gas developer would simply vent that carbon dioxide 
into the atmosphere.10  Instead, the petroleum companies operating Gorgon 
will sequester the carbon dioxide into a saline aquifer deep below nearby 
Barrow Island.11 
Australian lawmakers have begun to develop state and federal legal 
frameworks to govern the nascent CCS industry.  At the federal level, the 
Commonwealth issued a set of Guiding Regulatory Principles to give 
direction to the various states in developing consistent laws for CCS.12  
More recently, the Commonwealth suggested that federal CCS legislation 
will be based on the Offshore Petroleum Act.13  Amending the Offshore 
Petroleum Act would be in line with developments at the state level in 
Queensland and South Australia.14  In drafting future laws, legislators face 
the dilemma of how to regulate a new industry. 
                                           
3
  Int’l Energy Agency [IEA], Legal Aspects of Storing CO2, 14 (2005), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/co2_legal.pdf. 
4
  See Matthew Wald, In a Test of Capturing Carbon Dioxide, Perhaps a Way to Temper Global 
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at C3. 
5
  International Energy Outlook 2007, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DOE/EIA-
0484 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2007).pdf. 
6
  IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 20-21. 
7
  Id. at 33. 
8
  IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme, Projects Database – Gorgon Gas Development, 
http://www.co2captureandstorage.info/project_specific.php?project_id=122 (last visited Dec. 29, 2007). 
9
  Id. 
10
  Id. 
11
  See Barrow Island Act, 2003 (W. Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/ 
consol_act/bia2003145/index.html. 
12
  Aust. Gov’t, Dep’t of Indus., Tourism, and Res., Carbon Dioxide Capture and Geological Storage 
(CCS) Development of Regulatory Framework, http://www.ret.gov.au/Industry/Coal/Pages/ 
CarbonDioxideCaptureandGeologicalStorageCCSDevelopmentofRegulatoryFramework.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2008). 
13
  Id. 
14
  See Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act, 2004, §§ 12, 13 (Qld.) (Queensland added 
carbon dioxide to the definition of petroleum in its petroleum law.  As a result carbon dioxide may be 
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This Comment considers the application of Part IIIA of Australia’s 
Trade Practices Act (“TPA”) to the CCS industry.  Part IIIA is Australia’s 
default third-party access law and could be applied to infrastructure in any 
industry.15  Part IIIA regulates a third-party private company’s access to 
critical infrastructure, and allows for the creation of specific access regimes 
for industries prone to natural monopolies.16  This Comment argues that Part 
IIIA creates regulatory uncertainty for CCS investors and will deter 
investment in the CCS industry.  Part IIIA was enacted to support 
competitive marketplaces.17  For a new industry like CCS, any benefits to 
competition in the future are highly speculative, while the negative impacts 
for the investment climate are current and concrete.  The uncertainty created 
by Part IIIA heaps risk on an industry whose future is already plagued with 
unknowns.   
This Comment makes two basic assumptions.  First, it assumes that 
Australia will establish a carbon tax or cap-and-trade scheme that attaches a 
price to emitting carbon dioxide.18  Until emitting carbon dioxide costs 
money, there cannot be any significant market for services that avoid 
emissions.  Without a market, Part IIIA cannot promote market competition 
through third-party access.19 
Australia will likely establish a carbon tax or cap-and-trade scheme.  
In December of 2007, Kevin Rudd, Australia’s new Prime Minister, ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol, signaling to the world that Australia will redouble its 
efforts to address climate change.20  The new government announced that by 
2050 it will reduce emissions by 60%.21  The centerpiece of that strategy is a 
nationwide emissions cap-and-trade scheme that Rudd will put in place in 
2010.22  Rudd also renewed the government’s pledge to pursue clean coal. 
                                                                                                                              
transported and injected underground according to the standards laid out for natural gas transmission and 
storage.); Petroleum Act, 2000, part 1, div. 3 (S. Austl.) (South Australia took similar measures to allow 
transport and storage of carbon dioxide under its petroleum law.). 
15
  See RUSSELL V. MILLER, MILLER’S ANNOTATED TRADE PRACTICES ACT 186 (27th ed. 2006). 
16
  See Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44(G)(2)-(4) (Austl.); see, e.g., National Third Party 
Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems, 1 (1997) (establishing a third party access regime for 
natural gas pipelines, enacted by each of Australia’s state governments), available at 
http://www.coderegistrar.sa.gov.au/code.htm.  
17
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 185. 
18
  I base this premise on the pledge of the new government in Australia to enact a cap and trade 
scheme, see infra notes 20-24 and accompyaning text. 
19
  See infra Part III. 
20
  Media Statement, Kevin Rudd, Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (Dec. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.labor.com.au/media/1207/mspm030.php. 
21
  Id. 
22
  Id. 
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The net effect of these policies will be to put a price on emitting 
carbon dioxide and to encourage zero-emission electricity production, for 
example, burning coal for electricity in combination with CCS.  The cap-
and-trade scheme will slowly ratchet up the price of emissions as the 
government lowers the cap to meet its 2050 60% reduction target.23  The 
Rudd government will likely model its scheme on the design suggested by 
the National Emissions Trading Taskforce.24   
Second, this Comment assumes that Australia will rely primarily on 
private capital to develop CCS infrastructure and provide CCS services.  It is 
likely that Australia will rely on private capital because of the trend away 
from government owned enterprise and toward a reliance on the market to 
provide services.25  If, however, the Australian government does take a 
major role in financing CCS services and infrastructure, then the thesis of 
this Comment—that Part IIIA deters private investment—becomes moot. 
This Comment proceeds in four parts.  Part II of this Comment 
provides background on Australia’s third-party access law and CCS to 
explain the purpose of Part IIIA of the TPA and its intended purview.  Part 
III demonstrates that the criteria for access provided by Part IIIA do not 
generate firm expectations as to whether third-party access to CCS 
infrastructure will be required.  Part IV critically examines Australia’s access 
framework for natural gas pipelines to show that developing a similar regime 
for CCS is premature and creates an unjustifiable regulatory burden.  Part V 
argues that the ambiguity of Part IIIA’s criteria and the regulatory burden 
posed by an industry specific regime necessitate the exemption of CCS from 
Part IIIA.  
                                           
23
  National Emissions Trading Taskforce, Possible Design for a National Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading Scheme xv (Discussion Paper, 2006) [hereinafter NETT], available at 
http://www.emissionstrading.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/2017/Discussion_Paper_-
_Full_document.pdf.  A detailed discussion of such schemes is beyond the reach of this paper, but a few 
points are worth noting.  First, the emissions trading scheme will focus on stationary energy producers.  
Second, the initial allocation of emission permits will be a function of current usage with a remainder sold 
by auction.  Third, market forces will determine the value of the permits and in turn the associated cost of 
emitting carbon dioxide.  Fourth, the price of emitting carbon dioxide and in turn the incentive to sequester 
it will depend on the level the cap is set at, the pace at which the cap declines, and the penalty for emitting 
without a permit.  Estimates range from a price of between $5 and $15 per ton initially with an eventual 
price between $25 and $35 by 2060.  At these levels, CCS (using current technology) would only be viable 
for lower cost installations. 
24
  BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND RENEWABLE ENERGY: A NEW ERA FOR AUSTRALIA, 
4 (2007), http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/7CD97110-B285-4694-BD2B-0313F85E78E7/42983/ 
Climate_Change_Implications.pdf; see NETT, supra note 23. 
25
  See infra Part II.  
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II. AUSTRALIA ENACTED PART IIIA OF THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT TO 
GUARD AGAINST MONOPOLY AS IT PRIVATIZED CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
Australia enacted Part IIIA, its primary third-party access law, as one 
of many reforms intended to foster competition in the Australian economy.26  
Part IIIA regulates services provided via essential pieces of infrastructure.27  
If a service meets the statutory criteria established by Part IIIA, the service 
provider becomes subject to the regulator’s determination of whether access 
should be granted and on what terms.28  An airport is a classic example of 
essential infrastructure.  In that context, access would be granted to the 
services provided by the airport—use of runways, taxiways and other airport 
facilities.29  If the service provider and access seeker cannot agree on 
mutually agreeable terms arbitration will commence and terms will be 
imposed by regulators.30 
A. Australia Liberalized Trade and Privatized State-Owned Enterprises, 
Sparking Fears of Private Monopolies 
Over the last twenty years, Australia has moved away from relying on 
government-run companies to supply services toward a more laissez faire 
approach characterized by private companies operating in a competitive 
market.  Historically, government ownership of commercial, financial, and 
industrial enterprises was a major feature of the Australian economy.31  
Australian governments at the state and federal level owned and controlled 
the major part of the telecommunications, electricity, airports, gas 
production, banking, and railways industries.32 
When the Labour Party took power in 1983, it bowed to public 
pressure by introducing measures to liberalize Australia’s economy.33  
Australia floated its currency, deregulated its financial markets,34 and 
substantially reduced external tariffs.35  Gains from these liberalization 
                                           
26
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 185. 
27
  Id. at 183-84. 
28
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, §§ 44H, 44S (Austl.). 
29
  See infra Part II(A). 
30
  See Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44V (Austl.). 
31
  R. C. MASCARENHAS, GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: THE 
POLITICS OF ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 263 (1996). 
32
  Id. at 271. 
33
  Id. at 67-70, 269. 
34
  National Competition Council, Overview of National Competition Policy, http://www.ncc.gov.au/ 
articleZone.asp?articleZoneID=16 (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
35
  STEPHEN BELL & BRIAN HEAD, STATE, ECONOMY, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AUSTRALIA 235 (1994). 
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measures of the 1980s in Australia fueled the privatization and competitive 
reform efforts of the 1990s.36  From 1990 to 1997, sales of public assets in 
Australia totaled about 61 billion AUD, half of those at the federal level.37 
Privatization generated anxiety that the now private owners of unique 
infrastructure would operate as monopolists.38  Under government control, 
the facilities and infrastructure had been managed partially as instruments of 
social welfare with services provided equitably.39  Critics feared that after 
privatization, service providers would try to maximize profits and that, 
ultimately, consumers would suffer.40 
In 1992, a coalition of Australian governments formed a commission 
to consider the possibility of a national competition policy.41  Frederick 
Hilmer was appointed its chair.  He and his colleagues authored a report 
(“Hilmer Report”), which recommended a program of competitive reforms 
for Australia.42  The Hilmer Report argued that Australia needed to create a 
legal regime to establish access rights to “essential facilities.”43  The 
“essential facilities” contemplated in the Hilmer Report were those that 
could not be economically duplicated.44  Third-party access rights were 
envisioned as a way to promote competition in markets for services that 
relied upon these essential facilities.45 
A review of a recent case brought under Part IIIA will give shape to 
the concept of an essential facility.  In Re Virgin Blue Airlines, (“Virgin 
Blue”) the airline sought declaration and access to Sydney International 
Airport.46  Virgin Blue sought the right to use the airport facilities so that it 
could provide air travel for domestic passengers.47  To provide such services, 
the airline required access to the runways, taxiways, parking aprons, and 
terminals at Sydney International.48 
                                           
36
  MASCARENHAS, supra note 31, at 67-70, 270-71. 
37
  Reserve Bank of Australia, Bulletin: Privatisation in Australia, 7 (Dec. 1997), available at 
http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Bulletin/bu_dec97/bu_1297_2.pdf.   
38
  See FREDERICK G. HILMER, NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY: REPORT BY THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY xxx-xxxv (Australian Government Publishing Service 1993). 
39
  Id. 
40
  Id.  
41
  National Competition Council, supra note 34. 
42
  HILMER, supra note 38, at xxi-xxxv. 
43
  Id. at 239-68. 
44
  Id. at 239. 
45
  Id.  
46
  Re Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd. (2005) Austl. Competition Tribunal 5, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/ACompT/2005/5.html.  
47
  Id. ¶ 4. 
48
  Id. ¶ 8. 
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The Sydney International Airport qualifies as an “essential facility” 
because it is the major airport serving Sydney.  It would be difficult and 
expensive to build an airport to compete with Sydney International.  More 
importantly, it would be socially inefficient to build another airport when 
Sydney International can meet demand for air travel.  Naturally, any airline 
that wants to provide air travel to and from Sydney must have access to the 
airport.  In Virgin Blue, the Australian Competition Tribunal (“ACT”) 
ultimately required the airport to provide access to Virgin under the 
provisions of Part IIIA.49 
The Virgin Blue case demonstrates the role that third-party access law 
can have in enabling competition.50  In the absence of rights for third parties 
to gain access to infrastructure, the owner of a critical piece of infrastructure 
has the opportunity to act as a monopolist and set monopoly prices.  The 
immediate effect of inflated pricing is that consumers will pay more for the 
service in question than they would if multiple competing airports supplied 
the market.51  Such anti-competitive effects are not limited to the market for 
airport services, however.  In Virgin Blue, the ACT declared the airport 
services and granted access to Virgin in order to promote competition in the 
market for air travel.52  In the absence of effective third-party access law, the 
owner of an “essential facility” can stifle competition in related markets that 
depends on access to deliver services.  Without access to the runways, 
taxiways, parking aprons, and airport terminals at Sydney International, 
Virgin was unable to compete with other airlines in the market for air travel 
services.53 
B. Part IIIA of the TPA Ensures Competition Where Monopolies Exist 
In 1995, amidst widespread privatization of infrastructure, the 
Commonwealth enacted Part IIIA of the TPA.54  Part IIIA acts as the default 
third-party access law for Australia and applies unless supplanted by a more 
specific industry access code.55  
The ACT has explained that Part IIIA operates on the assumption that 
“competition, efficiency and public interest are increased by overriding the 
exclusive rights of the owners of ‘monopoly’ facilities to determine the 
                                           
49
  Id. ¶ 25. 
50
  Id. ¶¶ 1-25. 
51
  This conclusion flows from basic economic theory regarding price setting in monopolistic versus 
competitive markets. 
52
  See Virgin Blue Airlines, supra note 46, ¶ 20. 
53
  Id. ¶¶ 19-25. 
54
  Competition Policy Reform Act, 1995, § 59 (Austl.).  
55
  Trade Practices Act of 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44G (Austl.). 
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terms and conditions on which they will supply their services.”56  Part IIIA 
focuses on facilities “of national significance that it would be uneconomic to 
duplicate or replicate and that supply a service, access to which would 
promote competition.”57  In 2006, the Parliament clarified Part IIIA’s 
objectives:  Part IIIA is intended to “promote the economically 
efficient . . . use of and investment in infrastructure . . . thereby promoting 
effective competition in upstream and downstream markets.”58  Part IIIA 
also establishes a “framework . . . to encourage a consistent approach to 
access regulation in each industry.”59 
Part IIIA establishes three separate mechanisms to regulate third-party 
access.  First, an individual facility may be “declared” and thereby subjected 
to the third-party access rights set forth in Part IIIA.60 
Second, states may author their own access regimes.61  This process 
begins with a state submitting its regime to the National Competition 
Council (“NCC”), which then offers its recommendation as to certification 
of a state regime.62  The relevant government minister63 receives that 
recommendation and then makes the ultimate decision to certify the state’s 
regime as “effective.”64  If the minister does certify it, the regime becomes 
the controlling access regime for its subject matter within that jurisdiction.65  
Multiple states may also enact and seek certification of identical regimes to 
create multi-jurisdictional access regimes.66  In 1997, for example, the states 
passed identical laws to establish the National Third-Party Access Code for 
Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (“Gas Code”), which created a nationwide 
access regime for natural gas pipelines.67  
Third, facility owners may propose their own third-party access 
arrangement by submitting an application to the Australian Competition and 
                                           
56
  Re Australian Union of Students (1997) 147 A.L.R. 458, ¶ 28.  
57
  Id. 
58
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44AA (Austl.). 
59
  Id. 
60
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 187. 
61
  Id. at 190-91. 
62
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44M (Austl.). 
63
  NATIONAL COMPETITION COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ACCESS REGIME: A GUIDE TO PART IIIA OF 
THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT OF 1974 PART B, 8 (2002), available at http://www.ncc.gov.au/pdf/DEGeGu-
002a.pdf.  Normally, this will be a Commonwealth minister, usually a treasury official, but where the 
service in controversy is provided by a state government, that state’s chief minister will make the 
determination. 
64
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, §§ 44M, 44N (Austl.). 
65
  Id.  
66
  Id. 
67
  National Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (1997), available at 
http://www.coderegistrar.sa.gov.au/code.htm. 
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Consumer Commission (“ACCC”).68  This Comment does not explicitly 
consider the implications of owner-proposed access arrangements for the 
CCS industry.  Access arrangements must be approved by largely the same 
criteria as if they were reached by the declaration process.69  Also, the terms 
of such access arrangements must accord with the same pricing principles as 
those that would be set by regulators via the declaration process.70  The net 
result is that a service provider does not have any real incentive to commit to 
terms preemptively in an access arrangement when the possibility exists that 
the service will never be declared.  As a result, the declaration process 
provides the real incentive to act or not.  For this reason, this Comment 
focuses on the first two mechanisms available under Part IIIA:  declaration 
and certification.  This Comment considers each of these two mechanisms in 
turn, demonstrating that applying either to CCS would deter investment. 
III. LARGE AND UNIQUE PIECES OF CCS INFRASTRUCTURE WILL MEET THE 
CRITERIA FOR “DECLARATION” UNDER PART IIIA OF THE TPA  
Part IIIA can only be used to obtain third-party access where the 
service and corresponding facility meet six statutory criteria.71  Taken as a 
whole, these criteria for “declaration” are too amorphous to provide 
sufficient certainty for private investors embarking on CCS infrastructure 
projects.72  Because declaration may have serious consequences for how a 
service provider operates, the prospect of declaration makes it difficult to 
predict costs and revenues.  One important relationship, however, does 
surface:  the larger the infrastructure, the more likely it will meet the 
statutory criteria for declaration.  Specifically, pipelines and sequestration 
sites will be more likely candidates than capture facilities.73 
A. Declaration Is the Basic Mechanism for Allowing Third-Party Access 
The default mechanism for regulating third-party access under Part 
IIIA is by “declaration.”  “Declaration” grants a third party the right to 
negotiate with the service provider to set the terms of access to the service.74  
                                           
68
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 191. 
69
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44ZZA (Austl.) 
70
  Id. § 44ZZA(3)(ab). 
71
  Id. § 44G. 
72
  See infra Part III.  
73
  See infra Part III.C. 
74
  NATIONAL COMPETITION COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ACCESS REGIME: A GUIDE TO PART IIIA OF 
THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 PART A 9 (2002), available at http://www.ncc.gov.au/pdf/DEGeGu-
001a.pdf.  It is worth mentioning that access may be granted under other laws.  For example, under § 46 of 
the Trade Practices Act courts may grant access, but only with a showing of intentional abuse of market 
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A “service” for the purposes of Part IIIA means:  any service provided by 
means of a facility, including the use of infrastructure, the handling or 
transportation of goods or people, and communications infrastructure.75  Part 
IIIA offers no definition of facility, but the courts have made clear that the 
term requires some physical asset.76  For example, in Re Sydney 
International Airport, (“Sydney International”) the ACT “declared” freight 
handling services, and it identified the entire Sydney Airport as the facility 
attached to those services.77 
The process of declaration has two steps. First, an application is made 
to the NCC.78  The NCC reviews the application and makes a 
recommendation.79  The appropriate Minister takes the application along 
with the NCC’s recommendation, reviews it and makes the final decision 
whether to “declare” the service and subject it to the third-party access 
requirements of Part IIIA.80  The ACT hears appeals of declaration 
decisions81 and issues binding rulings.82 
Once the appropriate Minister declares a service, the owner of that 
service has two options.  Either it can reach a mutually satisfactory 
agreement with the access seeker or it can submit to a binding arbitration 
presided over by the ACCC.83  Under the second scenario, the ACCC’s 
arbitration decision dictates the terms of access for the service.84  If the 
owner can show that an access arrangement is infeasible, the ACCC may not 
require access.85 
                                                                                                                              
power.  Part IIIA allows for access without proving anti-competitive behavior has taken place.  See Trade 
Practices Act, 1974, § 46 (Austl.). 
75
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 189. 
76
  Id. at 191. 
77
  Re Sydney International Airport (2000) Austl. Competition Tribunal 1, ¶ 1, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/ACompT/2000/1.html. 
78
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 199-200. 
79
  Id.  
80
  Id. at 187. 
81
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, §§ 44K, 44L (Austl.). 
82
  See id. 
83
  See id. § 44S. 
84
  See id. § 44V. 
85
  Id. § 44V. 
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B. The Six Declaration Criteria Under Part IIIA Are Too Ambiguous to 
Allow Investors to Determine in Advance Whether a Piece of 
Infrastructure Will Be Declared 
Both the NCC and the relevant Minister evaluate the application for 
declaration based on six criteria intended to ensure that granting access will 
actually provide a net competitive benefit.86 These criteria are: 
(1) Access to the service must materially promote competition 
in at least one market other than the market for the service;   
(2) It must be “uneconomical” to develop another facility to 
provide the service;   
(3) The facility must be of national significance either with 
regard to its size, its importance to commerce, or its importance 
to the national economy;  
(4) The requested access must not pose an undue risk to human 
health or safety;   
(5) Access to the service must not already be covered by 
another effective access regime; and   
(6) The requested access must not be contrary to the public 
interest.87   
The ambiguity of these six criteria creates a real problem for an investor 
trying to predict whether a project will meet them.  To put the problem 
differently, the criteria are so broad that they seem to give regulators 
applying them a great deal of discretion. 
Before examining these criteria in greater depth, it is important to 
identify and describe the CCS services and facilities that could be subject to 
declaration under Part IIIA.  CCS projects have three phases, each of which 
will likely be considered a separate service for the purposes of Part IIIA.  
The CCS process begins with capturing the carbon dioxide from a large 
point-source emitter.88  A gas processing facility will be required to separate 
carbon dioxide from water and the other flue gases.89  The second phase of 
CCS, and second potential service will be the transportation of carbon 
                                           
86
  Id. §§ 44G, 44H. 
87
  Id. § 44G.  These six criteria are paraphrased here, but the essential language remains unchanged. 
88
  IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 19.  
89
  See id. at 24-26. 
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dioxide.  A pipeline and supporting compression facilities are necessary to 
transmit the carbon dioxide under pressure.90  The third phase of CCS will 
be geo-sequestration services.  A number of facilities, including an injection 
facility, monitoring equipment, and the actual subterranean storage site are 
essential to supply this service.91  For each of the three phases of CCS, there 
will be a service and related facilities that may be subjected to Part IIIA 
requirements.  
1. If CCS Facilities Operate as Natural Monopolies, Then Increased 
Access Would “Promote Competition,” and Declaration Will Be More 
Likely 
To satisfy the first criterion for declaration under Part IIIA, granting 
access to the service must “promote competition” in a market other than the 
one for the service.92  The ACT begins this analysis by defining relevant 
markets.93  In Duke Eastern Gas Pipeline Pty Ltd, (“Duke Gas”) the ACT 
defined the market in question as transmission of natural gas.94  Gas 
exploration, production, processing, distribution, and sales were all related 
but as distinct markets.95  By analogy, given the functional similarity 
between CCS and natural gas transmission, each stage of the CCS process 
likely would qualify as a separate market under the first criterion.  
Increased third-party access will only promote competition if the firm 
that controls the facility exercises a large degree of market power within the 
market being examined.96  Two factors determine a firm’s market power: the 
degree of control of the market and the susceptibility of the service to 
substitution.97  The more of the market a single firm controls, the more 
market power it has.  The fewer substitutes there are for a service, the more 
market power the service provider has. 
                                           
90
  Id. at 29-31.  Other means of transportation are possible, but pipelines represent the lowest cost 
option assuming a significant volume of carbon dioxide. 
91
  Id. at 31-35.  
92
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44G(2)(a) (Austl.). 
93
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 203. 
94
  Re Duke Eastern Gas Pipeline Pty Ltd (2001) Austl. Competition Tribunal 2, ¶ 77, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/ACompT/2001/2.html [hereinafter Duke]. 
95
  Id. 
96
  See MILLER, supra note 15, at 203. 
97
  See Specilalized Container Transport Application for Declaration of a Rail Service Provided by 
Rail Access Corportation: Reasons for Decision, National Competition Council, 10-13 (June 16, 1997), 
available at http://www.ncc.gov.au/pdf/DERaSnsRe-001a.pdf [hereinafter Specialized] (pointing out that 
the state-owned rail transport company owned the only track for the line in question, and, that air, sea, and 
road transport were poor substitutes for rail transport). 
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For example, in Re Specialised Container Transport, (“Specialised 
Transport”) the NCC recommended declaration of the freight services 
provided by a railway linking Broken Hill with Sydney.98  The NCC 
concluded that the Rail Access Corporation (“RAC”) had the requisite 
market power on two grounds.99  First, RAC wholly owned all rail lines in 
New South Wales (demonstrating a high degree of market control).100  
Second, the NCC determined that the alternative modes of freight—air, sea, 
and road—were poor substitutes for rail freight and, therefore, were not 
direct competitors (low susceptibility to substitution).101  By contrast, in 
Duke Gas, the ACCC decided that competition would not be promoted, in 
large part, because other pipeline routes were available to move gas to the 
market in question.102  In essence, Duke did not have a large enough share of 
market power to qualify its pipeline for declaration under the first criterion. 
The logic of the Duke Gas decision suggests that increased access to 
certain CCS services would likely promote competition in related markets.103  
First, a firm’s ability to compete in any of the three CCS service markets 
depends upon its access to the other related upstream and downstream 
markets.  A firm will not be able to provide carbon dioxide separation 
services unless it can guarantee access to a pipeline and sequestration site.  
As a result, CCS service providers in one market will have a strong case for 
access to the services and infrastructure of a related CCS service provider. 
Second, CCS firms may have significant market power.  The 
investment costs associated with CCS infrastructure will be large and will 
raise a serious barrier to market entry.  Pipelines are expensive to build, as 
are wells to drill.  Competition will also depend upon the availability of high 
quality storage sites in proximity to urban areas.104  If few good 
sequestration sites exist, then competition in that market will be necessarily 
limited.  Over the near term, demand for CCS services will also be quite 
limited.  As a result of this, and the fact that CCS infrastructure will require a 
large amount of capital, a single provider will tend to dominate early on. 
                                           
98
  Id. at 2. 
99
  See id. 
100
  Id. at 3.  
101
  Id. at 10-12. 
102
  Duke, supra note 94, ¶¶ 117-20. 
103
  See IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 19-29; Duke, supra note 94, ¶¶ 76-80, 117-20. 
104
  See generally JOHN BRADSHAW & TESS DANCE, MAPPING GEOLOGICAL STORAGE PROSPECTIVITY 
OF CO2 FOR THE WORLD’S SEDIMENTARY BASINS AND REGIONAL SOURCE TO SINK MATCHING, Greenhouse 
Gas Technologies Cooperative Research CO2CRCC & Geoscience Australia (2004), available at 
http://www.co2crc.com.au/PUBFILES/STOR0405/GHGT7_Bradshaw_potentialworldsedbasins.pdf 
(matching probable sequestration sites with emission sources). 
420 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 17 NO. 2 
 
 
Market power also depends on whether the service can be substituted 
by another competing service.105  CCS will likely be relatively immune to 
substitution because no other process takes carbon dioxide from a point-
source and permanently disposes of it.  Terrestrial carbon sequestration 
provides another means of trapping carbon dioxide, but because it absorbs 
ambient carbon dioxide and does not have the same guarantees of 
permanence, it is not a perfect substitute.106  Market power will also depend 
upon the availability of alternative services within the CCS industry.107  For 
example, pipeline operators may have to compete with freight companies to 
provide carbon dioxide transportation services.108  But, given that pipeline 
transport is the lowest cost option, there will likely be few competitive 
substitutes in that market.109 
Under the first criterion, CCS services may be good candidates for 
declaration.  First, the three markets for CCS services will be closely-tied; 
service providers in one market will depend upon access to the other 
connected markets to compete.  Second, because CCS services will be costly 
to provide, it will be common for markets to be served by a single provider.  
As CCS develops and more participants enter CCS markets, market power 
will tend to decline, and these conclusions may not hold.  As a result, the 
application of the first criterion depends on the time frame considered. 
2. CCS Infrastructure Will Likely Be “Uneconomical” to Duplicate 
The second criterion for declaration requires that the facility related to 
the service be “uneconomical” to duplicate.110  The NCC and ACT have 
discussed and attempted to clarify this facially ambiguous standard.  In 
Sydney International, the ACT explained that the “uneconomical to 
duplicate test should be construed in terms of the associated costs and 
benefits of development for society as a whole.”111  In Duke Gas, the ACT 
accepted NCC’s proposal that where a single facility can satisfy market 
demand at a lower cost than multiple facilities, it would be uneconomical to 
                                           
105
  See Duke, supra note 94, ¶¶ 116-24. 
106
  GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 693-94 (Michael B. Gerrard, ed., 2007). 
107
  This conclusion follows from the basic economic theory that a seller has little ability to set the 
price of a good if a buyer has readily available alternatives to the seller’s product. 
108
  See IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 181.  
109
  Id. at 190-91. 
110
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44G (Austl.). 
111
  Sydney, supra note 77, ¶ 204. 
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duplicate that facility.112  This concept of a socially efficient single provider 
is captured by the term “natural monopoly.”113 
Applying the uneconomical to duplicate criterion to the CCS context 
requires some speculation about the character of the market for geo-
sequestering carbon dioxide.  However, even without certainty of what 
carbon regulations will look like, useful comparisons can be drawn among 
the different types of CCS facilities.  Technical literature seems to assume 
that individual carbon capture facilities would attach to each large carbon 
dioxide emitter.114  Attaching capture facilities to emitters avoids the 
problem of having to transport the raw flue gas, which only contains 
between 3% and 12% carbon dioxide.115  As a result, capture infrastructure 
will not qualify for declaration under the second criterion. 
CCS pipelines are expensive to construct costing around $1 million 
U.S. dollars per meter in diameter, per kilometer.116  The cost of transmitting 
carbon dioxide calculated per unit of gas descends as the quantity of gas 
transmitted increases.117  This means that, all other things being equal, a 
large pipeline moves gas less expensively than two smaller pipelines.  
However, the size of a given CCS pipeline will also be a function of the size 
of the storage sites available for sequestration.  Widely-dispersed smaller 
storage sites will necessitate multiple smaller pipelines.  Clustered storage 
sites, or the existence of only one large viable storage site, would both tend 
to favor a single larger pipeline.118  Of course, the potential for multiple CCS 
pipelines presupposes a longer timeframe and a robust demand for 
transmission services.  Over the near term, because demand will be low, and 
the economies of scale are large, a market will almost certainly be most 
efficiently served by a single pipeline. 
It is unclear whether underground storage sites appropriate for CCS 
will exhibit the characteristics of a natural monopoly.  A variety of different 
geologic formations seem appropriate for CCS so that multiple viable 
                                           
112
  Duke, supra note 94, ¶ 64. 
113
  HILMER, supra note 38, at 239. 
114
  See, e.g., IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 108. 
115
  U.S. Department of Energy, Carbon Capture Research, http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/ 
sequestration/capture/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
116
  See IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 190-91 (extrapolating from graph showing relationship of cost 
of transport to diameter of pipeline). 
117
  Id. at 191. 
118
  Id. at 181-92. This discussion flows logically from the fact that cost of gas transmission declines 
as the width of a pipeline increases.  Only where the available sequestration sites limit the pipe width will 
multiple pipelines become more probable.  
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options should exist in a reasonable proximity to emissions sources.119  
However, the availability of alternative sites does not mean that using 
multiple sites will be efficient.  If a CCS pipeline qualifies as a natural 
monopoly, then it will also be most efficient to sequester carbon dioxide at a 
single location.120  A single storage location does not necessarily imply a 
single storage site.  The property interests in subterranean storage capacity at 
a particular location may be divided among various property owners so that 
multiple injection wells operated by different companies is conceivable.121  
More likely though, the property interest will be held by a single entity122 
and the allocation of property rights to storage capacity will only reinforce 
the tendency for geo-sequestration facilities to behave as natural monopolies 
in a given CCS market. 
3. Larger CCS Infrastructure May Be “Nationally Significant” 
Under the third criterion, a facility cannot be declared unless it is of 
“national significance” in either size, importance to commerce, or general 
importance to the national economy.123  Historically, this criterion has had a 
relatively straightforward application.  Large, unique pieces of infrastructure 
like airports124 and railways125 have qualified easily.  The most important 
element of the “national significance” criterion in the CCS context is the 
question of importance to commerce.  In Re Australian Union of Students, 
the ACT refused to declare access to a computer network because the 
theoretical economic benefit was negligible as a contribution to Australia’s 
                                           
119
  See id. at 94-96, 197 (mapping the relationship between sources of carbon dioxide and likely 
storage basins; discussing the various geologic formations appropriate for sequestration). 
120
  See id. at 42, 259-63.  This conclusion follows to the extent pipelines are significantly more 
expensive that sequestration rights and the associated facilities.   
121
  See Australian Bureau of Statistics, 7113.0 - Agriculture, Australia, 1999-2000, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/PrimaryMainFeatures/7113.0?OpenDocument (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2008).  Most rural land in Australia is held in large tracts by either the government or its lessees, 
and, therefore, subterranean interests are likely to be unified rather than divided among many property 
owners.  This conclusion is drawn loosely from the fact that 59% of land (456,000,000 hectares) in 
Australia is used for agriculture, and that land is operated by about 102,500 businesses, so that average land 
per agricultural business is equal to roughly 4450 hectares, or 17.2 square miles.  See MINTER ELLISON, 
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: REPORT TO THE AUSTRALIAN GREENHOUSE OFFICE ON PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND ASSOCIATED LIABILITY 66-70 (2005), available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/ccs/ 
publications/pubs/ccs.pdf.  This conclusion also assumes that the property interest in subterranean 
sequestration capacity will be joined to the surface interest. 
122
  See Australian Bureau of Statistics, 7113.0 - Agriculture, Australia, 1999-2000, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/PrimaryMainFeatures/7113.0?OpenDocument (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2008).  This supposition follows very generally from the fact that agricultural parcels in Australia 
are quite large and that sequestration sites are more likely to be located in undeveloped areas.  
123
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44H (Austl.).   
124
  Sydney, supra note 77, ¶ 4. 
125
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 207. 
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national economy.126  CCS facilities are unlikely to be of national economic 
importance in the sense of industry earnings, at least initially. 
CCS facilities may meet the national significance standard as a means 
to mitigate climate change.  In Specialised Transport, the NCC considered 
the strategic importance of a rail line used for transporting grain, coal, and 
steel against the background of the commercial importance of those 
industries.127  Similarly, one could argue that CCS enables the continued 
viability of energy generation from fossil fuels, which would by extension 
make CCS infrastructure nationally important.  Or, if a court reasons that 
climate change has a negative impact on Australia’s economy, then 
infrastructure playing a role in mitigating climate change may be nationally 
significant.  The application of this criterion depends upon the interpretation 
a particular regulator gives to national significance. 
4. Access to CCS Infrastructure Will Not Pose Unusual Safety Risks 
Under the fourth criterion, access to a service cannot be declared if 
doing so would pose an undue risk to human health or safety.128  This 
criterion focuses on whether new operators would pose some novel risk to 
safety.  In Sydney International, the NCC was unconvinced that a small 
freight handler would, simply as a function of its size, be less safe than 
existing handlers.129  In Specialised Transport, the NCC reasoned that 
existing regulations governing the rail transport would suffice to ensure that 
the access seeker would operate safely.130  Because access to CCS 
infrastructure will simply amount to either transmitting or sequestering 
carbon dioxide, there is no reason to think that access will pose safety risks 
so long as the infrastructure has unused capacity to sell. 
Under the fifth criterion, the Minister may not declare a service under 
Part IIIA if another “effective” access regime already regulates the 
service.131  This criterion observes the states’ right to create their own access 
regimes.  No such regime exists or has been proposed for CCS. 
                                           
126
  Brenda Marshall & Rachael Mulheron, Access to “Essential Facilities” Under Part IIIA of the 
Trade Practices Act: Implementing the Legislative Regime, 10(1) BOND L. REV. 99, ¶¶ 33-36 (1998), 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/BondLRev/1998/6.html. 
127
  Specialized, supra note 97, at 23.  
128
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44H(4) (Austl.).   
129
  Sydney, supra note 77, ¶¶ 209-14. 
130
  Specialized, supra note 97, at 24. 
131
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44H (Austl.).   
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5. Declaration of CCS Infrastructure May Be in the “Public’s Interest” 
Finally, Part IIIA requires that declaring the service will not be 
contrary to the “public interest.”132  In its recommendations, the NCC 
mentions a number of factors that it considers when determining whether 
access serves the public interest.133  Many of these seem to bleed into the 
other five criteria; for example, the NCC will consider “policies” concerning 
“occupational health” and “the competitiveness of Australian businesses.”134  
However, the NCC has explained that the many factors captured within the 
public interest criterion were intended to address the “net impact of 
declaration on economic efficiency.”135 
In evaluating applications under this criterion, the NCC has explicitly 
considered a few factors that are particularly relevant to CCS.  The NCC has 
made clear that the public has an interest in promoting ecologically 
sustainable development.136  This factor strongly supports declaration of 
CCS services because the Australian government has identified CCS as a 
part of its strategy for economically sustainable development.137  However, 
the NCC has also indicated that its declaration recommendations will be 
sensitive to the broader economic context.138  The NCC’s guiding principles 
set out regional economic development as an important component of the 
public interest.139  The NCC added another dimension to this component in 
Re Australian Cargo Terminal Operations Pty Ltd, where it considered 
whether declaration would “undermine the investment environment 
necessary for significant competition.”140  If declaration of CCS services 
represents a regulatory risk, then declaration may not be in the public’s 
interest.  These factors identify the tension within the sixth criterion.  
Ultimately, the determination under this criterion will be fact-based and 
somewhat subjective.141 
                                           
132
  Id. § 44H. 
133
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 208-09. 
134
  NATIONAL COMPETITION COUNCIL, supra note 63, at 2. 
135
  Id. at 20.  
136
  Specialized, supra note 97, at 37. 
137
  National Clean Coal Initiative–Fact Sheet, Australian Labor Party, http://www.labor.com.au/ 
download/now/national_clean_coal_initiative_factsheet_campaign_launch.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
138
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 208. 
139
  NATIONAL COMPETITION COUNCIL, supra note 63, at 21. 
140
  MILLER, supra note 15, at 209. 
141
  See Brenda Marshall & Rachael Mulheron, Declarations Under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices 
Act: The Case for Abolishing the Public Interest Criterion, 15 BOND L. REV. 296 (2003) (arguing that the 
public interest criterion lacks any real character and simply turns on the determinations of the other 
criteria). 
MARCH 2008 CARBON CAPTURE UNDER AUSTRALIAN ACCESS LAW 425 
  
C. Larger CCS Infrastructure Projects Will Be Better Declaration 
Candidates 
Applying each of the six criteria on a theoretical basis does not 
resolve the question of whether the CCS industry as a category will be 
subject to declaration under Part IIIA of the TPA.  Ultimately, the individual 
character of a service will determine whether declaration is appropriate.  Yet, 
the criteria draw out some general themes that are important to third-party 
access to CCS services and infrastructure.   
First, CCS pipelines and storage sites are more likely to exhibit the 
characteristics of natural monopoly.142  As a result, where a single entity 
controls CCS transmission or sequestration, increased access to that service 
will likely promote competition in upstream and downstream markets.  The 
basic characteristics of the CCS industry then raise the prospect of 
declaration for investors considering CCS projects.  
Second, CCS as an industry raises somewhat novel questions for the 
national significance criterion.143  An analysis that focuses narrowly on the 
size of CCS facilities and the revenues they generate may not find that CCS 
facilities qualify.  However, to the degree that the analysis considers the role 
CCS plays in the broader economic context, as a process that reduces the 
negative impacts of burning fossil fuels, CCS facilities may be deemed 
nationally significant.  The malleability of the third criterion makes it 
unclear whether CCS services and facilities will meet its requirements. 
Third, Australia’s “public interest” is necessarily a heterogeneous 
concept and eludes straightforward application.  The public interest may 
change with political tides.  For example, if the new government pursues an 
aggressive emissions reduction strategy, will that represent the evolving 
public interest?  Even more troubling, the application of the public interest 
criterion will change depending on the timeframe considered.  Imagine that 
one CCS pipeline exists to serve a particular urban area and that it presently 
meets demand for transport services.  Over the near term, declaring the CCS 
service and subjecting the pipeline to third-party access would likely provide 
a net benefit to competition in related CCS service markets.  Additionally, 
regulators would likely view declaration as a way to support ecologically 
sustainable development.  However, forcing CCS pipeline operators to 
submit to access may dissuade other potential competitors from building 
competing pipelines.  Over the long term, declaring an individual CCS 
service may stunt the wider development of the industry.  The competing 
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  See supra Part III.B. 
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  See id. 
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visions of the public interest incorporated within the sixth criterion make a 
prediction about declaration for CCS services and facilities very difficult.  
The most important, albeit limited, conclusion to be drawn from the 
foregoing analysis is that the larger the CCS infrastructure, the more likely it 
is to be subject to declaration.  The larger the infrastructure, the more 
difficult it will be to duplicate it under the second criterion.  Likewise, under 
the national significance and public interest criteria, larger infrastructure fits 
the declaration criteria more easily.  This result is somewhat troubling for 
two reasons.  First, if CCS is to develop on a significant scale, large projects 
will be critical to establish a backbone of infrastructure.  Second, to the 
degree that the prospect of declaration deters investment, entrepreneurs will 
be reluctant to embark on large CCS infrastructure projects.  
Ultimately, applying the criteria to the CCS context results in a great 
deal of uncertainty.  Part IIIA’s criteria do not provide clear enough guidance 
for whether and when CCS services will be declared.  The next Section 
explores one possible method to avoid this uncertainty, which is to develop 
an industry specific access regime for CCS.  However, as the next Section 
makes clear, an industry regime for CCS would not eliminate uncertainty for 
CCS investors because of the many unknowns that still remain for the 
industry. 
IV. THE GAS CODE PROVIDES DETAILED RULES TO GOVERN THIRD-PARTY 
ACCESS TO PIPELINES 
The Gas Code is a prominent example of an industry specific access 
regime “certified” under Part IIIA.  The criteria for “coverage” under the 
Gas Code are largely identical to the “declaration” criteria of Part IIIA.144  In 
addition, the Gas Code requires the operators of “covered” pipelines to set 
terms of access and conduct their operations according to strict principles.145  
A similar access regime might be created for CCS to avoid some of the 
vagaries of Part IIIA.  However, the next three Sections identify the hazards 
of implementing an industry specific code for CCS. 
A. State Regimes Must Be “Certified” to Supplant Part IIIA 
States may also develop their own access regimes.  A regime must be 
certified by the appropriate Commonwealth minister to become “effective” 
                                           
144
  National Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (1997) at 4, available at 
http://www.coderegistrar.sa.gov.au/attachments2/codeC4.pdf. 
145
  Id. at 8-9.   
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for purposes of Part IIIA.146  If the Treasurer certifies a state’s access regime, 
the services and facilities covered by the state regime are no longer subject 
to declaration under Part IIIA.147  That minister may only certify a state 
regime if it conforms to the principles of Part IIIA.148  Typically state 
regimes are tailored to the needs of one industry, its economics, its services, 
and its facilities.149  By narrowing the scope of application, state access laws 
supply more meaningful guidance to market participants in the particular 
industry.   
No state-based access regime has yet been proposed to govern CCS 
services and facilities.  However, as the industry develops, a narrower 
approach to access regulation may have advantages.  A comprehensive state-
based access regime would increase predictability for potential investors.  
Yet, with detail comes increased compliance costs.  The following Section 
will discuss the major features of the Gas Code to identify the costs 
associated with it. 
B. The Contours of the Gas Code Parallel Those of Part IIIA  
The Gas Code became law as part of South Australia’s Gas Pipelines 
Access Act of 1997.150  The other Australian states and the Commonwealth 
passed identical laws to establish a uniform national access regime.  
Australia enacted the Gas Code with a few primary objectives in mind.  
First, the Gas Code was intended to create a transparent process to facilitate 
third-party access to natural gas pipelines.151  Second, by creating such a 
process, the Gas Code was intended to facilitate the development of a 
national, integrated gas pipeline network.152  Third, the Gas Code was 
intended to prevent the abuse of monopoly power, promote competition 
within the gas market, and provide for resolution of access disputes.153  
The Gas Code only regulates access to those pipelines that have been 
approved for coverage.154  At its inception, a large number of pipelines were 
                                           
146
  Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44N (Austl.).   
147
  Id. § 44G(2)(e).   
148
  Id. § 44H. 
149
  National Competition Council, Gas Code–Certification, http://www.ncc.gov.au/ (last visited on 
Jan. 10, 2008) (follow “Acesss > Certification” on the drop-down menu under “Select NCC Activity”).  
150
  National Competition Council, Energy: Gas: National Gas Code, http://www.ncc.gov.au/ (last 
visited on Jan. 28, 2008) (click on “Energy;” then click on “Gas;” then click on “National Gas Code”).  
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  National Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (1997) at 1, available at 
http://www.coderegistrar.sa.gov.au/attachments2/codeC4.pdf.  
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expressly covered by the Gas Code.155  New pipelines may also be added if 
an application meets the coverage criteria.156  The Gas Code does not 
address access issues surrounding facilities upstream from gas pipelines.  
Nor does it pertain to “any tanks, reservoirs, machinery, or 
equipment . . . downstream of the connection point to a consumer.”157  The 
Gas Code applies only to the transmission segment of the natural gas market. 
The criteria for “coverage” under the Gas Code are largely the same 
as the criteria for “declaration” under Part IIIA of the TPA.  Just like Part 
IIIA, the Gas Code requires the following:  1) coverage must promote 
competition in another market; 2) the pipeline must not be economical to 
duplicate; 3) the requested access must not compromise human health or 
safety, and; 4) the requested access must not be contrary to the public 
interest.158  Under the Gas Code there is no requirement that the pipeline be 
of national significance.  By eliminating the nebulous national significance 
requirement, the Gas Code puts pipeline operators on notice that regulators 
may permit access to any size pipeline.  Defining the scope of coverage 
should, in theory, reduce uncertainty for service providers and allow for 
better investment decisions. 
Once coverage has been approved under the Gas Code, the owner of 
the pipeline must publish an “access arrangement” setting the terms of 
access to the pipeline.159  The access arrangement must specify the service 
covered, the terms and conditions governing supply of that service, and the 
tariffs that will be charged for the service.160  The tariff or price of access 
under the agreement must be set at an “efficient” level that “replicates” the 
price of a competitive market without distorting investment decisions in 
related markets.161  The access agreement must be published along with 
information concerning spare pipeline capacity and the procedure for 
making access requests.162  The Gas Code also requires that covered 
pipelines be separated operationally for accounting purposes, or as it calls it, 
by a “ring fence” from other “related businesses” that the owner runs.163  
This “ring fencing” obligation is intended to prevent operators from giving 
preferential terms to related businesses. 
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  Id. at 2. 
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  Peter Rose, Third Party Access to Upstream Facilities, AMPLA Yearbook 164, 179 (1999). 
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  Peter Slattery, Gas Pipeline Access Regulation and New Pipeline Developments, AMPLA 
Yearbook 309, 337 (2001). 
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C. The Gas Code Imposes a Heavy Regulatory Burden 
The Gas Code’s operational and reporting obligations impose a 
substantial regulatory burden on pipeline operators.  The ACT admits that a 
decision to cover a pipeline can have major commercial implications for the 
owner or operator of the pipeline.”164  In part, this is a result of the “detailed 
requirements as to the terms of [a]ccess [a]rrangements” and related 
reporting obligations.165  The burden also results from the “quite detailed 
provisions as to how a service provider is to ‘ring fence’ its pipeline 
activities from other operations.”166  The benefits of more comprehensive 
access requirements must be evaluated in light of these increased 
compliance costs. 
At least one company viewed the strictures of the Gas Code with such 
distaste that it preemptively filed an application for an undertaking under 
Part IIIA to avoid coverage.167  In general terms, the company argued that 
the Gas Code effectively prohibits a company from setting prices at a level 
and for a duration that ensure a fair return on investment.168  First, it argued 
that the Gas Code’s “cost of service” approach to price setting did not 
capture the real cost of providing pipeline services.  Pricing should not 
reflect merely the cost of providing a service, but should also consider, and, 
reward a service provider based on the risk inherent to the venture.169  
Second, the company argued that it should be allowed to set a longer pricing 
schedule—twenty years—than the term typically approved by regulators—
five years.170  Third, the company argued that it should be permitted to set 
prices below cost initially to attract business and above cost over the long 
term to recoup early losses.171  A recent trend of applications to revoke 
coverage of pipelines bears out the legitimacy of these frustrations.172 
Parts III and IV of this Comment examined two mechanisms for 
regulating third-party access under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act.  Part 
III argued that the declaration criteria are too ambiguous to supply reliable 
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prospective guidance for private investors considering CCS projects.  Part 
IV reviewed the third-party access code enacted to govern natural gas 
pipelines to highlight the burdens associated with such an approach.  Part V 
argues that both these approaches to third-party access regulation under Part 
IIIA deter investment, and that Australia should exempt CCS from Part IIIA 
to provide CCS investors with clear expectations prior to beginning a major 
CCS infrastructure project.  
V. AUSTRALIA SHOULD EXEMPT CCS FROM PART IIIA TO INDUCE 
INVESTMENT 
In order to foster CCS, Australia should critically evaluate the 
deterrence effect Part IIIA will have on investment.  As an alternative to the 
general provisions of Part IIIA, Australia could establish an industry specific 
regime for CCS, but doing so would be premature and would create a 
significant regulatory burden.  Instead, Australia should allow for some kind 
of exemption vehicle under Part IIIA and use it to shelter CCS. 
A. Australia Must Consider Part IIIA’s Implications for Investment 
As Australia formulates its approach to third-party access for CCS, it 
should consider what impacts potential access regimes will have on 
investment in the industry.  Arguably, Part IIIA will increase predictability 
for CCS investors by ensuring that participants in one market, like 
transmission, have access to other related markets, like sequestration.  
However, access issues only arise once infrastructure exists.  To the extent 
Part IIIA dissuades investment, access issues are secondary.  Australia 
should focus on addressing the regulatory risk associated with Part IIIA as it 
impacts CCS.  First, the ambiguity of the declaration criteria generates 
uncertainty for investors considering a new infrastructure project.  Second, 
the discretionary powers given to regulators to set access terms make it 
difficult for investors to gauge the likely rate of return for their projects. 
B. Creating an Industry-Specific Regime for CCS is Premature 
Part IV discussed how the Gas Code works to increase predictability 
for natural gas pipeline operators.  First, the Gas Code applies only to a 
single well-defined industry.173  Second, the Gas Code contains detailed 
guidance for access seekers and service providers by streamlining the 
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criteria for coverage, requiring pipeline operators to publish access 
arrangements, and by establishing detailed guidelines for setting access.174 
An industry specific regime for CCS could benefit the industry by 
avoiding the vagaries of Part IIIA and increasing predictability.  For 
example, if CCS is of national significance as an industry, it might make 
sense to extend coverage to all CCS infrastructure where access would 
promote competition as does the Gas Code.  A CCS Code could be limited in 
scope to the services likely to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics— 
pipelines and sequestration sites.  Because the markets for transmission and 
sequestration will be closely tied, clear rules defining access rights between 
the two would tend to promote investment in both markets.   
The problem with developing an industry-specific CCS Code is that 
no CCS industry yet exists.  The need for access regulation is, at this point, 
purely speculative.  The costs of CCS projects and services are relatively 
unknown.  The future demand for CCS services depends upon when and 
how Australia regulates emissions.  Too little is known about CCS to justify 
a detailed approach to access.  As discussed in Section IV, the Gas Code also 
imposes a substantial regulatory burden on pipeline operators.  While 
compliance costs are tolerated in industries with demonstrated profitability, 
such costs would be abortive for CCS. 
In 2004, the Productivity Commission conducted a review of the Gas 
Code (“Gas Code Report”) in which it highlighted this regulatory burden 
and its effects on investment.175  The Gas Code Report noted that the criteria 
for coverage under the Gas Code created the same type of regulatory 
uncertainty as do the declaration criteria under Part IIIA.176  The Gas Code 
Report also reviewed scholarship in the natural gas industry in an effort to 
determine empirically whether the Gas Code has stunted pipeline 
investment.  Ultimately, the authors of the Gas Code Report could not 
determine whether the Gas Code had depressed investment in new pipeline 
infrastructure.177  However, they did conclude that the Gas Code was likely 
to distort investment away from riskier projects.178  Two reasons explain 
why investors would be unlikely to take on riskier pipeline projects.  First, 
regulators who set the terms of access to pipelines have no way to 
“distinguish between competitive pipelines that experience better than 
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expected outcomes and pipelines that are exerting market power.”179  
Second, investors believe that regulators will not award higher profits for 
riskier projects because they are biased in favor of consumers and access 
seekers.180 
C. The Regulatory Risk Endemic to Part IIIA Deters Investment 
As demonstrated in Part III of this Comment, applying Part IIIA’s 
declaration criteria to the CCS industry does not produce a clear sense of 
whether CCS services and facilities will be subjected to its requirements.  In 
part, this flows from the ambiguity inherent to the criteria.  The national 
significance and public interest tests are particularly problematic.  Both these 
criteria are somewhat subjective and may be prone to inconsistent 
application, either by different regulatory bodies, or because of a change in 
political climate. 
In part, this regulatory uncertainty flows from the unknowns of the 
CCS industry.  First, because CCS technology and methodology have not 
been fully commercialized, the economies of scale for the CCS industry are 
not yet clear.  Without knowing, for instance, whether carbon dioxide 
separation will be a centralized service, it is hard to predict whether 
separation facilities will meet the declaration criteria.  Second, a great deal 
of work remains to be done in locating good sequestration sites and 
determining their capacities.  The availability of sites will shape the industry 
and determine whether CCS infrastructure will exhibit natural monopoly 
characteristics.  If it appears that markets will tend to be served most 
efficiently by multiple pipelines and sequestration sites, the whole 
discussion of Part IIIA may be moot because the market for CCS services 
would likely be competitive. 
In part, regulatory uncertainty results from the language and design of 
Part IIIA.  In 2001, the Productivity Commission published a comprehensive 
evaluation of Part IIIA (“IIIA Report”).181  The IIIA Report admits the 
continued need for a national access regime, but also identifies a number of 
deficiencies in the regime that should be addressed.  In the words of the 
Commission, “[M]ost importantly, the national access regime does not do 
enough to guard against the possibility that investment in essential 
infrastructure will be deterred.”182 
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The IIIA Report begins by noting that the facilities contemplated by 
Part IIIA are large and costly.183  Where the life of a project spans decades 
and the capital costs are in the many millions, any regulatory risk raises 
serious concerns for investors.  Once the piece of infrastructure is built, the 
costs are sunk and must be recovered through user fees.  In the context of 
these immense projects, the potential that Part IIIA will ultimately dictate 
how a service provider operates may dampen investment.184 
The IIIA Report also suggests that regulators tend to take the side of 
access seekers when they set the terms of access to services.185  To induce 
investment, a project must promise returns in proportion to the risk involved.  
As the IIIA Report points out:  “once a facility is operating, it will be 
impossible for regulators to delineate any upside returns from monopoly 
rent—that is, returns in excess of those necessary to justify the 
investment.”186  In other words, what a regulator sees is a facility that makes 
money.  The regulator does not tend to consider the alternative scenario in 
which the facility fails as a business venture. 
D. The 2006 Amendment to Part IIIA Did Not Go Far Enough to Redress 
the Deterrent Effect of Part IIIA on Investment 
The parliament responded to the Part IIIA Report by passing the Trade 
Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act of 2006 (“2006 
Amendment”).187  This amendment included a number of measures to clarify 
Part IIIA’s purpose and application.  A new subsection, 44AA, added an 
“objects” clause to make as clear as possible the purpose motivating Part 
IIIA:  “To promote the economically efficient operation of, use of and 
investment in infrastructure . . . .”188  The 2006 Amendment also tweaked the 
language of the first declaration criteria to raise the threshold for declaration. 
The word “material” was added so that 44G now reads in relevant part:  
“Access . . . to the service [must] promote a material increase in 
competition.”189 
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The 2006 Amendment also established a set of pricing principles to 
guide regulators in setting the terms of access.190  Section 44ZZCA reads in 
relevant part:  “[A]ccess prices should be set as to generate expected 
revenue . . . that is at least sufficient to meet efficient costs . . . and include a 
return on investment commensurate with regulatory and commercial risks 
involved.”191  It also provides that “access pricing structures should allow 
multi-part pricing and price discrimination when it aids efficiency.”192 
These revisions are a laudable effort to improve the workability of 
Part IIIA and an appropriate response to the IIIA Report.  However, they also 
underscore the tension inherent to this type of competition law between 
market efficiency and social equity.  The new objects clause of 44G did 
clarify the purpose of Part IIIA, but it did not eliminate the difficulty of 
applying the law in practice.  
Subsection 44G mentions economic efficiency with regard to three 
elements:  the use of, the operation of, and the investment in infrastructure. 
Efficiency will be defined somewhat differently when considered from each 
of these three perspectives.  When the user reads efficient, it understands 
cheaper.  When the operator reads efficient, it understands more expensive.  
When the concept of efficiency is applied to investment at the societal level 
it necessarily invites an inquiry into concepts of the public good.  Do we 
mean the efficient level that allows universal access?  Or, do we mean the 
efficient level to ensure a robust investment climate?  This same tension 
crops up in 44ZZCA, albeit to a lesser extent.  Price structures “should allow 
multi-part pricing and price discrimination when it aids efficiency.”193  
Again, the language begs the question: efficiency from whose point of view?  
In light of these tensions, it is unclear to what extent the 2006 Amendment 
will actually result in greater predictability for industry.  
E. Part IIIA Should Be Amended to Allow Access Holidays 
Though the 2006 Amendment made significant improvements, it did 
not adopt the Productivity Commission’s recommendations wholesale.  The 
IIIA Report recommended that Part IIIA be amended to establish a 
mechanism for investors to determine the applicability of the declaration 
criteria before embarking on a project.194  The IIIA Report argued that such 
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prospective rulings would allow investors to move forward with increased 
confidence.195  Part IIIA does not provide for prospective rulings.196   
The IIIA Report also recommended further research into the 
exemption of projects from Part IIIA.197  It called the case for implementing 
a mechanism to redress the deterrent affects of Part IIIA “compelling” and 
“imperative” and hoped that a scheme would be in place by 2003.198  In the 
Productivity Commission’s view, such a change is critically important 
because it would generate certainty for business prior to making an 
investment.199  
One mechanism considered by the IIIA Report, called an “Access 
Holiday,” would preclude declaration of a piece of infrastructure under Part 
IIIA for a defined period of time.  In considering the problem of regulatory 
risk, Gans and King demonstrate that access holidays can be a simple and 
effective approach to exemption where regulators cannot commit in advance 
to fair terms of access.200  Access holidays work in a way similar to patents 
by creating a limited period of time during which the owner has an 
unfettered ability to set prices as it wishes.  For industries without 
demonstrated economics, like CCS, access holidays would eliminate 
regulatory risk. 
F. Australia Should Exempt CCS in the Near Term to Encourage 
Entrepreneurial Investment 
Australia should exempt CCS from Part IIIA until the industry 
develops to the point where it becomes clear that subjecting it to a third-
party access regime would benefit society.  At present, any benefits of 
applying third-party access law in the CCS context are speculative whereas 
its detriments are relatively clear.  Leaving CCS exposed to Part IIIA would 
deter investment.  Generally, the deterrent effect of Part IIIA exacerbates the 
uncertainties particular to CCS.  More specifically, the national significance 
criterion of Part IIIA might deter investors from pursuing large CCS 
projects.  If CCS is to develop on a significant scale, large projects will be 
essential for creating a backbone for the industry to develop around.  The 
multifarious nature of the public interest criterion also leaves investors 
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uncertain of whether a potential project will be subject to declaration.  A 
CCS investor may well worry that a regulator’s particular breed of public 
interest will result in a project’s declaration. 
The regulatory uncertainties generated by Part IIIA cannot be resolved 
by creating an industry specific regime for CCS.  First, the character and 
economics of the industry are unclear so that creating a detailed access code 
is premature.  Second, at this stage of development, CCS investment 
continues to be an entrepreneurial activity and as such it would not bear the 
regulatory burden created by a comprehensive access regime.  Third, 
experience with the Gas Code demonstrates that even detailed access codes 
suffer from a degree of regulatory uncertainty that may distort investment.   
The 2006 Amendment recognized, and in part redressed, the negative 
impact Part IIIA has on infrastructure investments, but it didn’t go far 
enough.  The addition of clear pricing principles was a boon that should 
ensure more favorable access terms in the future that account for investment 
and regulatory risks.  More than likely though, investors will continue to 
expect, and rightly so, that regulators will underestimate such risks when 
they are evaluated ex post in light of a functioning and successful project.  
The objects clause also helps by stating unequivocally the purpose of Part 
IIIA.  This addition may enhance uniformity across regulatory bodies, but 
that remains to be seen.  Ultimately though, these measures fall short 
because they do not give true ex ante certainty to investors. 
Parliament should act on the Productivity Commission’s critique of 
Part IIIA by allowing for prospective rulings and creating some mechanism 
for exempting projects under Part IIIA.  The simplest way to exempt CCS 
projects would be to grant access holidays.  This approach has numerous 
benefits.  First, it will avoid the deterrent effects on investment associated 
with the regulatory risk of Part IIIA.  Second, it would avoid the regulatory 
burden associated with an industry specific access code.  Third, it would 
signal to potential investors that the Australian government intends CCS to 
play an important role in mitigating climate change.  Finally, access holidays 
would allow companies to contract with each other freely without fear that 
prices or terms will be imposed unexpectedly. 
It is also worth pointing out that the dangers from a laissez-faire 
approach to CCS access regulation are minimal because there will be little 
ability for CCS operators to reap monopoly profits.201  In the natural gas 
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industry, consumers cannot easily substitute gas for another product.  People 
need it to heat their homes, produce chemicals, generate electricity, and 
support manufacturing.  Where only one company sells gas, it may well 
have substantial power to set prices because, at least in the near term, 
consumers have no real alternative to buying the gas.  By contrast, in the 
context of CCS, government regulation will set the price of emitting carbon 
dioxide.  The level of the Australian carbon cap will establish the practical 
ceiling for prices in the CCS service markets.  Emitters will always face a 
choice between emitting carbon dioxide and paying the associated penalty, 
and paying the CCS service provider its fee.  As a result, CCS service 
providers will have little ability to leverage market power above the 
government determined emission price. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has considered how Part IIIA of the Trade Practices 
Act will impact the nascent CCS industry.  Although some markets for CCS 
services will exhibit characteristics of natural monopoly, leaving CCS 
exposed to Part IIIA is unwise.  Part IIIA creates regulatory uncertainty and 
would deter investment in CCS infrastructure.  An industry specific code 
might reduce uncertainty, but the CCS industry has not developed enough to 
permit such an approach.  If Australia wants to induce investment in the 
area, it should exempt CCS from Part IIIA.  This approach avoids the 
regulatory risks and burdens associated with Part IIIA and would allow CCS 
to develop organically. 
